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DOES NEW ZEALAND'S IMMIGRATION POLICY BREACH 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS? 
I INTRODUCTION 
The question that this paper sets out to answer is whether or not New Zealand's 
immigration policy, or more precisely, the Government residence policy that sets out the 
criteria for immigration selection, breaches the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 .1
 
Like most states, New Zealand generally developed immigration law in response to 
political pressure to exclude or favour particular migrants. Sometimes the objective of an 
enactment has been blatantly discriminatory. Examples include the Chinese Immigrants 
Act 1881 , which the Government enacted to prevent an illusory invasion of Chinese 
migrant workers,2 and the Immigrants Restriction Act 1889, which required all applicants 
to pass a dictation test in any European language. Following WWI, the New Zealand 
Government allegedly pursued a "White New Zealand" immigration policy.3 
Whilst these laws have been replaced by the Immigration Act 1987, which on its face 
contains very few discriminatory provisions, 4 the heart of current immigration law is the 
policy contained in the Immigration Manual. This policy is not subjected to parliamentary 
scrutiny, and unless the Bill of Rights applies to it, there is no legal mechanism to prevent 
that policy discriminating on grounds that are prohibited in other areas of public and 
private activity. 
1 Immigration policy controlling temporary entry may also be discriminatory. One source of 
discrimination may be the criteria that is used to identify potential overstayers. This possibility is 
illustrated by the Canadian case Naqvi v Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission) [1993] 
2 CIIRD 57. An immigration official denied Ms Naqvi a visa because he believed that she was likely 
to become an illegal overstayer. His belief was not supported by any objective evidence of the 
applicant's intention, but was based on the fact that she was a single, female Pakistani. The Canadian 
Human Rights Tribunal accepted that there was unjustified discrimination. 
2See W Borrielmmigration to New Zealand 1854 -/938 (Demography Programme, Research School 
of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991) 170-176. At the time the Act was 
passed the number of Chinese migrants was steadily declining. 
3 S Brawley "No 'White Policy' in NZ: Fact and Fiction in New Zealand's Asian Immigration Record, 
1945-1978" (1993) 27 NZ Jnl History 16. 
4For example s4 discriminates between New Zealand citizens and aliens when it says that New 
Zealand citizens do not have to have a residence permit. This will not be in breach of the Bill of 
Rights because s6 of the Act allows inconsistent enactments to prevail. 
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The question that this paper raises requires an examination of the legal status of 
immigration policy and the interface between the Bill of Rights and the Human Rights 
Act. These will be addressed in parts III and IV. Part V identifies prima facie 
infringements of the Act. Part VI discusses the operational provisions of the Act and 
applies them to the policy to ascertain whether there is an actual breach. 
II BACKGROUND 
Immigration is widely regarded as a sovereign power of state. 5 Whilst international 
lawyers may dispute whether this is correct, or whether the state enjoys an absolute 
power, 6 the judiciary in Common Law jurisdictions has tended to adopt an especial 
deference to the state in matters concerning immigration because of it. This deference has 
tended to make it difficult for applicants to succeed in judicial review of decisions in 
immigration cases.7 In the United States it has led to conservative resolutions of the 
constitutional issues that immigration cases have raised. 8 In Canada there has been similar 
reluctance to extend human rights protection in immigration cases.9 The same may be trne 
of New Zealand courts. However, whilst this approach may have been acceptable in the 
past, New Zealand's international human rights commitments now demand that the state 
affords members and non-members the same right to freedom from discrimination.
10 
III GOVERNMENT RESIDENCE POLICY - ITS STATUS AND CONTENT 
A The Legal Status of Government Residence Policy 
Traditionally, New Zealand's immigration policies have been purely voluntary rules with 
no legal effect. However the authorising provisions of the Immigration Act 1987 suggest 
5R PI ender International Migration Law (2ed Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, Norwell , MA, 1988) 61-
62. 
6See above n 5, 75-77. 
7SH Legomsky Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and America (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1987) chl. 
8See above n 7, 325. 
9C Tie "Immigrant Selection and the Canadian Human Rights Act" (1994) 10 JL & Soc Pol'y, 81. 
10New Zealand has signed numerous international human rights treaties, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
International Covenant of Economic. Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Convent.ion on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. See P Hunt and M Bedggood " The 
International Law Dimension of Human Rights in New Zealand in G Huscroft and P Rishworth (eds) 
Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1991 
(Brooker's Ltd, Wellington, 1995) 43-45 . 
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that, at least in part, the policy now falls into a grey area called "administrative quasi-
legislation"11 The term "quasi-legislation" covers a wide range of rules that have varying 
degrees of legal effect. Their only common feature is that they are not enforceable directly 
through criminal or civil proceedings.12 There are as yet, no definitive rules for 
determining whether quasi-legislation is "law" or merely administrative rules. 13
 Although 
it is outside the scope ofthis paper to provide a definitive answer on the legal status of 
immigration law, a brief discussion may clarify some of the issues and enable an 
assumption to be drawn. 
1 The relevant provisions of the Immigration Act 
The Immigration Act 1987 reformed the numerous immigration enactments and 
amendments that dated back to 1919.14 In 1991, Parliament amended the Act to include 
new provisions concerning Government residence policy and the Minister's discretionary 
power to grant permits and visas . Sections 8, 9, and I O empower the Minister, or 
authorised immigration officials, to grant residence or temporary permits and visas at their 
discretion. Section 13A instructs the Minister to publish Government immigration policy, 
regarding the rules and criteria used to determine eligibility for the grant of visas and 
permits. Publication includes, but is not limited to, insertion of the policy in the 
d~partmental manual of immigration instructions, and making the manual available to the 
public. 
Under sl3B, the Minister must reduce Government residence policy to writing and certify 
it before it is published. Section 13B(3) defines the kinds of policy that can be 
Government residence policy, for example, rules or criteria for determining the eligibility 
of applicants, and any general or specific objectives of the Government. Section 13C(l) 
requires immigration officers to make decisions about residency applications in terms of 
the policy. The Minister is similarly bound to make decisions in terms of the policy but 
retains a discretion to issue visas or permits as an exception to the policy in any particular 
case. 15 A right of appeal to the Residence Appeal Authority16 lies against the decision of 
immigration officials to refuse residence visas or permits. The grounds of appeal are that 
11 G Ganz Quasi-Legislation: Recent Developments in Secondary Legislation (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1987) 1. 
12See above n 11. 
13See R Baldwin and J Houghton "Circular Arguments: the Status and legitimacy of Administrative 
Rules" [1986) Public Law 239. 
14 Immigration Act 1987. Second Schedule. 
15Section 13C(l)-(2). 
16The Residence Appeal Authority is set up under sl8B of the Immigration Act. 
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the refusal of an application was not correct in terms of the Government residence policy, 
or that special circumstances require consideration of an exception. However, there is no 
right of appeal from the Minister's decision.17 
2 Policy or law? 
The question of the legal status of immigration policy published under the 1991 
amendments has never come before the New Zealand Courts. 18 Despite the an1endrnents, 
the Court of Appeal has continued to treat the policy as voluntarily adopted rules in the 
context of judicial review. 19 However, the new provisions suggest that this view may be 
incorrect. Legal status is not determined by the form that the rules appear in, nor whether 
they were placed before the House of Representatives, although these are relevant in 
deciding what is law. Ultinlately, the court must examine the legitimacy and nature of 
particular rules to determine what legal force they have.2° Clearly, Government residence 
policy has some legal effect because it is binding on the Residence Appeal Authority, the 
immigration officers and to a linlited extent, the Minister. However, the Minister retains 
an ultimate discretion that is not fettered by the policy. This must lead to the conclusion 
that immigration policies are still only policies, not law. To hold otherwise would be to 
impose a limit on the Minister's power to grant visas and permits, as an exception to the 
policy, or to refuse entry to those who satisfy the policy. This is not the intended effect of 
the empowering provisions of the Immigration Act. This conclusion is important because 
it affects the application of the Bill of Rights, which will be discussed in part VI. 
B Residence Application Categories 
Immigration policies are published in the Immigration Manual, a single volume21 that 
details the administrative procedures and requirements that applicants for temporary and 
permanent entry must follow. It also sets out the residence application categories and 
selection criteria. Most applicants seeking residency visas or permits must apply under 
17Sections 8(2), 10(2), and 18C(l)-(2). 
18The question of the status of English immigration rules has come before the House of Lords. In R v 
Chief Immigration Officer, exp. Bibi [ 1976] 1 WLR 979, Roskill LJ. held that the rules, which had 
some legal effect and could be vetoed by parliament, were just as much delegated legislation as any 
other form of rule-making power. However in subsequent cases the House of Lords has retreated from 
this view. 
19See Chiu v Minister of Immigration [I 994] 2 NZLR 541. 
20See above n 11 , 4; n 13, 246-247. 
21 The previous version of the manual was spread over four volumes but the old policy was replaced on 
October 31 1995. 
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one the following categories: General Skills, Business Investor, Family, or Humanitarian. 
There are also special categories for Pitcairn Islanders and Western Samoans, and a 
separate category for refugees .22 Generally, primary applicants can include spouses and 
dependent children on their application. 
All applicants must satisfy the general requirements of "good health" and "good 
character." 23 In addition to the general requirements, there are category specific 
requirements . The General Skills and Business Investor categories operate on a points 
system. Applicants get points for each criterion that they satisfy. Applicants with fewer 
than a specified number of points will automatically be denied entry. The Minister may 
raise or lower the cut-off mark, to keep migrant numbers within the Government's target.
24 
Both categories require the primary applicant, and any family members who apply under 
the primary application, to satisfy a minimum English language requirement. 25 Under the 
General Skills category, applicants score points for factors such as qualifications, work 
experience, and age. Applicants under the Business Investor category score points for 
factors such as business investment funds , business experience, qualifications, work 
experience, and age. 
The Family category allows people to apply on the basis that they have a relationship with 
a New Zealand citizen or resident, or have immediate family members permanently 
residing in New Zealand. Applicants may apply under the Humanitarian category only if 
they have the support of a close family member residing permanently in New Zealand, and 
are in circumstances that are causing serious physical or emotional harm to the applicant 
or a family member, which can only be resolved by granting residence. 
Special categories include schemes set up to deal with particular ethnic groups; for 
example, the Western Samoa quota scheme, and a special entry policy for Pitcairn 
Islanders . Entry requirements are significantly lower for these applicants . 
22The policy relating to refugees is not examined in this paper. 
23New Zealand Immigration Service Operational Manual, pols 1.19 and 1.20. 
24See above n 23 po! 3.9. 
25See above n 23 pol 13.15 
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IV DOES THE BILL OF RIGHTS APPLY TO GOVERNMENT RESIDENCE 
POLICY? 
Immigration selection appears to fall squarely within s3 of the Bill of Rights, which says 
that the Act applies to acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the 
Government of New Zealand. However this presumption does not take into account two 
problems raised by sl9 of the Bill of Rights and the Human Rights Act 1993 . Before 
discussing the problems, the relevant background and provisions of the Human Rights 
Act will be set out. 
A Section 19 of the Bill of Rights 
When the Bill of Rights was enacted in 1990, s 19 affirmed the right to be free from 
discrimination on seven grounds. These grounds were: colour, race, ethnic or national 
origins, sex, marital status, and religious or ethical belief. The Bill of Rights did not 
include any specific limits on those grounds, although s5 said generally, that reasonable 
limits are allowed. Under this version of s 19, there was no doubt that the Government 
r~sidence policy could not discriminate on the prohibited grounds.
26 However, in 1993 the 
Human Rights Act was introduced. Section 21 (I) of the Act contained an expanded list of 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. Subsections (a) to (g) covered the seven grounds that 
are listed above. In addition there were six new grounds in subsections (h) to (m): 
disability, age, political opinion, employment status, family status, and sexual orientation. 
The new Act also amended s 19 of the Bill of Rights. Now s 19 no longer lists prohibited 
grounds of discrimination, instead it says that the prohibited grounds are those contained 
in 'the Human Rights Act. This requires us to tum to s21 of the Human Rights Act when 
applying s 19 of the Bill of Rights. 
B Relevant Provisions of the Human Rights Act 
The Human Rights Act also contains provisions limiting the scope of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. These provisions may affect the application of s 19 of the Bill 
26PA Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Company Ltd, 
Sydney, 1993) 853. 
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of Rights . Two provisions are of particular importance. These provisions are: 
151 (1) Except as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall limit or 
affect the provisions of any other act or regulation which is in force in New 
Zealand. 
(2) Except as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act relating to 
grounds of prohibited discrimination other than those described in 
paragraphs (a) to (g) of section 21(1) of this Act shall affect anything done 
by or on behalf of the Government of New Zealand. 
153(3) Nothing in this Act shall affect any enactment or rule of law, or any policy 
or administrative practice of the Government of New Zealand, that -
(a) Relates to immigration; or 
(b) Distinguishes between New Zealand citizens and other persons, or 
between British subjects or Commonwealth citizens and aliens. 
Section 152 says that on 31 December 1999, sl51 will expire. Until then however, 
sl51(2) says that only the seven grounds set out in s2l(l)(a) to (g) will apply to acts of 
the Government. Section 153 seems to say that the Government may discriminate on any 
grounds in immigration matters. 
C The Effect of the Human Rights Act on the Bill of Rights 
The first issue that the Human Rights Act raises is whether the amendment to s 19 carried 
the limits in sections 151 and 153 through to the Bill of Rights . The question requires 
statutory interpretation of the provisions that amended s 19. The amending provision is in 
sl45 of the Human Rights Act. It says: 
145 Related amendments to other enactments - The enactments specified in 
the Second Schedule to this Act are hereby amended in the manner 
indicated in the Schedule. 
The Second Schedule says: 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 [is amended] by repealing section 19 
and substituting the following section: "19. Freedom from discrimination -
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(1) Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of 
discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993 ... .. " 
There is nothing in the wording of s 145 or the schedule to suggest that s 19 implicitly 
includes these, or any other limitations contained in the Human Rights Act.27 However, it 
is not yet possible to conclude that the Human Rights Act does not affect s 19. This is 
because s4 of the Bill of Rights says that legislation that is inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights will prevail over it. Does this mean that where the Human Rights Act allows the 
Government to discriminate, it must prevail over the Bill of Rights? 
The question can be answered by turning to s 151 ( 1) of the Human Rights Act ( set out 
above), which says that the Human Rights Act does not affect any other legislation. This 
means that, at least until sl5 l expires, neither Act can affect the other. They stand as 
two separate remedies. This was probably the Government's intention since, although the 
it contains no specific limits, the Bill of Rights does not make the rights it affirms 
absolute. The rights can be restricted by reasonable limits and the Government can pass 
legislation that authorises infringements of the rights . 
Although no case has settled the matter, the recent High Court case Quilter v The 
Attorney Genera/28 lends some support to the view that the Human Rights Act does not 
~ffect the Bill of Rights . This case concerned the right of lesbian couples to obtain a 
marriage licence. It was brought under s 19 of the Bill of Rights, for discrimination on 
the ground of sexual orientation [ s2 l ( 1 )(m) of the Human Rights Act]. Because of 
s 151(2) no right of action was available under the Human Rights Act for discrimination 
on this ground by the Government. The Court did not consider the effect of s 15 l (2) on 
the Bill of Rights. However the fact that it heard the case and made a finding under the 
Bill of Rights suggests that it believes that the Bill of Rights stands as a separate right of 
action, which can be used when a matter is excluded from the Human Rights Act. 
If the argument that the Bill of Rights is not affected by the Human Rights Act is wrong, 
then until 31 December 1999, s 19 is limited to the seven grounds in s2 l ( l )(h) to (m) of 
the Human Rights Act. However sl53 may not prevent the effective provisions of sl9 
27Even if two interpretations of sl 9 were available, the long title of the Act would require the 
interpretation most favourable to the protection of the rights to be adopted. The long title says: An Act 
(a) to affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand; and (b) 
to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. In 
order to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the Covenant, the rights need to be consistent with it. 
The prohibited grounds are already more restricted in New Zealand and if sl 9 was interpreted as very 
limited, the inconsistency would become much greater. 
28Unreported, 28 May 1996, High Court, Auckland Registry, M.177/96. 
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from applying to immigration selection. Chauvel has suggested that immigration 
selection never fell within the scope of the Human Rights Act, so sl53 does not authorise 
discrimination in this area (nor does it prohibit it) .29 This means that there is no 
inconsistency between the Bill of Rights and the Human Rights in respect of immigration 
selection.30 Although Chauvel's argument is interesting, when sl51(1) of the Human 
Rights Act is taken into account the Bill of Rights stands as a separate remedy. 
V PRIMA FACIE INFRINGEMENTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
The policies described below are prirna facie in breach of the Bill of Rights because they 
discriminate on prohibited grounds: 
I General requirements 
(a) Good health 
All applicants for temporary entry and permanent residency must be in good health. 
The applicant must furnish acceptable medical and X-ray certificates, and may be 
assessed by a consultant physician. The physician may determine that an applicant is 
not in good health if she or he is: 
(i) likely to be a danger to the public health; and /or 
(ii) likely to be a burden on the health services; and/or 
(iii) unfit for the purpose of entry 
Section 21 ( l )(h) of the Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
disability, which includes physical, psychological, or intellectual disability; illness; or 
the presence in the body of organisms capable of causing illness . 
29C Chauvel "New Zealand's Unlawful Immigration Policy" (1994) 4 Aust Gay & Lesbian LJ 78. 
Chauvel's argument must be based on the premise that the granting of visas and permits does not fall 
within the meaning of "services" in the context of the sections prohibiting discrimination in the 
provision of goods, services, and facilities. This interpretation is supported by Amin v Entry Clearance 
Officer, Bombay [1983) 2 All ER 864. In this case the House of Lords held that granting entry 
vouchers was not the provision of a "service" to immigrants but the performance of a duty of 
controlling immigration. 
30See above n 29, 77-78. Chauvel argues that this interpretation does not render sl53 meaningless; it 
will still apply where immigration matters fall within the various provisions of the Human Rights Act. 
He gives as an exan1ple, the Department of Labour's practice of employing only New Zealand citizens 
for certain immigration positions. In this respect the Human Rights Act is inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights, and would prevail. 
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(b) Polygamous marriages 
A principal applicant in a polygamous marriage is allowed to have only one partner 
approved for residence. Other partners may not subsequently apply for residency 
based on their relationship with a successful applicant. This provision discriminates 
on the ground of marital status in s2 l ( 1 )(b) of the Human Rights Act. The common 
law definition of marriage applicable in New Zealand is limited to one male and one 
female,31 but if the applicants' marriage is legal in their own country it will be 
recognised as a valid marriage in New Zealand.32 
If the practice is based on religious belief it may also fall under s 15 of the Bill of 
Rights, which affirms the right of every person "to manifest that person's religion 
in ... practice." It may also fall under s20, which affirms the rights of minorities in 
New Zealand to enjoy their culture. The policy prima facie infringes the Bill of 
Rights on the first ground and possibly the other two grounds. 
2 General Skills and Business Investor criteria 
(a) Age 
Applicants in the General Skills and Business Investor categories receive points on 
the basis of their age (see table 1). Applicants over the age of 56 arc not eligible to 
apply under the General Skills category. 33 Applicants over the age of 64 cannot apply 
under the Business Investor Category.34 The scheme discriminates on the basis of 
age, which is prohibited by s2 l (1 )(i) of the Human Rights Act. 
However, subsection (i) gives a narrow definition of "age." Until 31 January 1999, 
"age" means any age commencing with the age of siA1een years and ending with the 
age that people in general qualify for national superannuation under s3 of the Social 
Welfare (Transitional Provisions) Act 1990.35 This means that the age limit on 
applicants under the Business Investor category is not "age discrimination ." The 
31Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee (1966) [1861-73] All ER 175 
32Halsbury's Lmvs of England (4 ed, Butterworths. London, 1980) vol 8, Conflict of Laws. para -l78, 
p349; New Zealand Commentary on Halsb111y's Laws of England ( .J. ed, Buttenvorths, Wellington, 
1985) binder C, Conflict of Laws, para C4 78. 
33See above n 23 , po! 3. I 9. 
34See above n 23, pol 3.42. 
35Under the s3 of the Transitional Provisions, the qualifying age for national superannuation is 
gradua1ly increasing from 60 to 65 years. 
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policy does discriminate against people between the ages of 16 and the qualifying age 
for national superannuation, firstly by awarding different points to different age 
groups, and secondly, by not including people aged 16 or 17 years in the General 
Skills category. 
Table 1: 
General Skills Business Investor 
Age Points Age Points 
18-24 8 0-24 0 
25-29 10 25-29 10 
30-34 8 30-34 8 
35-39 6 35-39 6 
40-44 4 40-44 4 
45-49 2 
50-54 0 
55-59 -2 
60-64 -4 
(b) Homosexual partners 
Homosexual partners are only eligible for residence if their partners are New Zealand 
citizens or residents. This means that primary applicants under the General Skills or 
Business Investor categories who are in homosexual relationships, will not be able to 
include their partners on their application. Section 2 l(l)(m) of the Human Rights Act 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. This provision also prima 
facie infringes the Bill of Rights . 
(c) English language requirement 
Primary applicants under the General Skills and Business Investor categories are 
required to satisfy the minimum English language requirements set out in the manual . 
If primary applicants include on their applications a spouse or partner, or any 
dependants aged sixteen or more, these family members must satisfy the language 
requirement. If the family members do not speak enough English, the application may 
be granted on the condition that the applicants pay a bond.36 
36 Applicants must provide a certificate of the International English Language Testing System 
(IELTS) or evidence that they have an English speaking background. A bond of $NZ 20 OOO is 
required for every non-principal applicant over 16 years included in the application of the principal 
applicant, who does not meet the English language requirement. The bond is repaid if the applicants 
pass the language requirement within a certain time of settling in New Zealand. 
11 
On its face, this policy seems not to discriminate on any of the prohibited grounds. 
However, by imposing a greater obstacle for people of non-English speaking 
countries, the policy effectively discriminates on the grounds of race, ethnicity, or 
nationality. The Canadian Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of "adverse effects 
discrimination. "37 The doctrine expands discrimination to include "the imposition of 
obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions that result from a policy or practice 
which is on its face neutral but which has a disproportionately negative effect on an 
in individual or group because of a special characteristic of that individual or 
group ."38 The Human Rights Act explicitly covers such discrimination in s65. This 
approach is desirable in the context of the Bill of Rights. If it is adopted then the 
language requirement would constitute discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
or nationality, which is prohibited by subsections (f) and (g) of the Human Rights 
Act. 
(d) Minimum work experience 
Applicants cannot apply under the General Skills category if they have less than two 
years work experience related to the qualifications that they have claimed points for. 
Discriminating against people on the basis of their work experience is not 
discriminatory per se, but it could result in adverse effects discrimination by 
excluding some unemployed people. The unemployed people who would be excluded 
are those that do not satisfy the minimum relevant work experience. This is 
inconsistent with the prohibited ground of employment status in s2 l ( 1 )(k), which 
includes being unemployed. 
370ntario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v Simpson Sears [1985] 2 SCR 536, 551 ; 
Menghani v Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission) [1992] 4 CHRD 41, 53 . 
38See Menghani , above n6, 55. 
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3 Fami(v Criteria 
(a) Married siblings or children 
Potential migrants who apply under the Family category, as siblings or adult children 
ofNew Zealand citizens or residents, must be single. Section 2l(l)(b) of the Human 
Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the grounds of marital status which includes 
being married. The policy discriminates on this ground. 
(b) Homosexual couples 
Homosexual couples must live together for four years before they are eligible to 
apply as defacto partners. In contrast, heterosexual must only live together for two 
years . This policy is inconsistent with s2 l (l )(m), sexual orientation; and possibly 
subsections (b), marital status, and (I), family status.39 
4 Special Category - Pitcairn Island Policy 
_The Pitcairn Islander policy makes it easier for people of one nationality to enter New 
Zealand. This is inconsistent with the s2l(l)(g) ground of nationality. 
VI IS THERE A BREACH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS? 
A How Should the Operational Provisions be Applied? 
The Bill of Rights contains three operational provisions, sections 4, 5, and 6, which 
instruct the court on how to apply the Bill to acts of the government. Since the Bill of 
Rights came into effect, these provisions have generated a considerable amount of judicial 
and academic comment but it is still not clear how the provisions should be applied. 40 
39This policy was identified and discussed by Chauvel, see above n 29. 
40See J Elkind "On the Limited Applicability of Section 4 of the Bill of Rights" [ 1993] NZLJ 111 ; P 
Rish worth "Applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to Statutes" [1991] NZLR 33 7; J 
McClean, P Rishworth, and M Taggert "The Impact of the New Zealand Bill of Rights on 
Administrative Law" The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research Foundation 
Seminar, 1992) 62; P Rishworth "How does the Bill of Rights Work? [1992] NZRLR 189. 
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Two approaches are identified and used in this paper. Before discussing the approaches, it 
will be helpful to set the provisions out in full : 
s4 Other enactments not affected - No court shall , in relation to any 
enactment. ... 
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or 
revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision ofthis 
Bill of Rights 
sS Justified limitations - Subject to s4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society. 
s6 Interpretation consistent with bill of rights to be preferred - Wherever 
an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to 
any other meaning. 
The leading case on the application of the operational provisions is Ministry a/Transport 
v Noort. 41 It does not however, provide a definitive approach to the application of the 
provisions because the Court of Appeal was split. Cooke P. and Gault J. thought that the 
inquiry should begin with s6 so that wherever possible, a meaning consistent with the Bill 
of Rights is adopted. If the courts cannot find a meaning consistent with the Bill of Rights, 
then s4 requires that the inconsistent enactment will prevail. According to Cooke P. and 
Gault J., s5 was relevant only when the courts were addressing a common law limit or 
when the Attorney-General reported to the House of Parliament, as required by s7 . The 
rest of the Court saw a place for s5 in interpreting statutory provisions . For Richardson J. 
(McKay concurring), s5 preceded s6 . For Hardie Boys J., s5 allowed an enactment to be 
consistent with the Bill of Rights if it imposed only reasonable limits _42 As yet there is no 
precedent that applies these provisions in the administrative law area. 
41 [1992] 3 NZLR 260. 
42See above n 26, 856-861. 
Since the Government residence policy is not law, it does not fall within the meaning of 
s4.43 However, the authorising provisions of the Immigration Act do, so it is necessary to 
see whether they are consistent with the Bill of Rights or whether they authorise breaches. 
The first approach adopted here to ascertain a breach, is based on the judgments of Cooke 
P. and Gault J. It gives primacy to s6 with the result that if a consistent interpretation of 
the empowering provision is available the courts must adopt it. Section 4 will only come 
into play if there is no possible interpretation consistent with the Bill of Rights, and s5 
does not come into play at all. This approach gives the greatest protection to the rights and 
freedoms in the context of delegated powers because it prevents the erosion of rights by 
reasonable limits. This point will become more apparent when the results under the two 
approaches are compared. 
It may be arguable that the first approach makes s5 redundant. For this reason, the 
provisions will also be analysed under a second approach that combines s6 and s5. This 
approach is consistent with Hardie Boys' view of the role of s5 . 44 This refocusses the 
inquiry on whether there are reasonable limits on the rights in question. If there are, then 
these limits are not in breach of the Bill of Rights but are part of an interpretation that is 
consistent with it. 
B Giving Primacy to Section 6 
The Minister of Immigration, as a member of the Executive, is bound by s3 to obey the 
Bill of Rights unless Parliament gives him a statutory authority to infringe it. In that case, 
s4 says that the empowering statutory provision will prevail over the rights and excuse the 
prima facie infringement. The question that s6 raises is whether the empowering 
provisions can be interpreted to permit the Minister to certify and apply only policies that 
are consistent with the Bill of Rights . Section 6 is not limited to cases of statutory 
ambiguity but extends to apparently clear statutes, with broad or vague wording, including 
broadly worded discretionary powers .45 McLean, Rishworth, and Taggart have argued 
that empowering provisions can be interpreted consistently with the Bill of Rights. This is 
achieved by reading into the provision an implicit proviso that the discretion must not be 
43For a discussion of the meaning of "enactment" in the context of the Bill of Rights see 
above n 29, 78-79. 
44See above n 41. 287. This approach was also adopted by McClean et al , see above n 40. 
45P Rishworth and S Optican "Two Comments in i\lfinistry a/Transport v Noort" (19921 NZRL 189, 
19 l n 8. 
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exercised so as to infringe the Bill of Rights .46 Thus s 13A authorises the Minister to 
certify Government residence policy so long as it is with in the kinds of policy allowed by 
s 13 B and does not infringe the Bill of Rights . 
This analysis is consistent with the view that discretionary powers are not absolute but are 
subject to implicit limitations . The common law limitations include the judicial review 
concepts of "reasonableness" and "relevance. "47 There is no reason why the Bill of Rights 
should not implicitly impose a statutory limitation. It must be presumed that Parliament 
would not intend delegated powers to be used inconsistently with the Bill of Rights, since 
this would open a backdoor to breaches of fundamental human rights. This would be at 
odds with the purpose of the Act and with the fact that Parliament has required itself to 
disclose any inconsistencies with the Bill of Rights in proposed legislation. 48 
Reading in a proviso is supported by the Canadian Supreme Court's approach under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, 
the Supreme Court held that "it is impossible to interpret legislation conferring a discretion 
as conferring a power to infringe the Charter - unless of course that power is expressly 
conferred or necessarily implied."49 In New Zealand, if the empowering provision 
expressly or necessarily implies that the Minister has the power to infringe the Bill of 
Rights, then by virtue of s4, the empowering provision prevails and the prima facie 
infringements are excused. 
There is nothing express, nor necessarily implicit, in the empowering provisions of the 
Immigration Act to authorise an infringement of the Bill of Rights . Section l 3B(3)(a) 
authorises as Government residence policy any rules or criteria for determining an 
applicant's eligibility, being rules or criteria relating to the circumstances of that person. 
The effect of the provision is not substantially undermined if the criteria cannot be 
discriminatory in terms of sl9 of the Bill of Rights . The Immigration Manual already 
contains many policies that have not been found to be prima facie infringing. Therefore the 
provision does not "necessarily imply" that the Minister can breach the Bill of Rights . In 
conclusion, the empowering provisions of the Immigration Act can be interpreted 
consistently with the Bill of Rights and furthermore and s6 demands that this consistent 
interpretation be adopted. This means that the Minister has no power to act inconsistently 
with the Bill of Rights and all of the infringing policies are ultra vires the Immigration Act 
and in breach of the Bill of Rights. 
46See McLean above n 40, 71 . 
47See above n 46. 
48New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s7. 
4959 DLR (4th) 416, -l-44. 
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C Reading Sections 5 and 6 Together 
This approach requires the court to interpret the empowering provisions of the 
Immigration Act as including the proviso "but not so as to unreasonably infringe the Bill 
of Rights ." For the reasons already given under the first approach, this proviso can be read 
in. The difference between the two approaches is that in the first instance any 
infringements constitute a breach, but in the second instance only those limits that are 
unreasonable will constitute a breach. 
The next step is to see whether the limits imposed by the residence policy are reasonable. 
Section 5 requires a two-step inquiry. Firstly, it must be shown that the policy is 
prescribed by law; secondly, it must be shown that it imposes reasonable limits that are 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
The New Zealand courts have not defined a test for either step. In Noort, the Court of 
Appeal discussed the definition of "prescribed by law" and expressed approval for the 
approach taken in Canadian cases. 50 The Canadian Supreme court had held that the 
phrase included (but wasn't necessarily limited to) statutes, regulations, the operating 
requirements of a statute or regulation, or the common law. 51 This list did not include 
11:1Ies made under a discretionary power. For a time, the Canadian courts were uncertain 
whether the latter came within the phrase "prescribed by law" but the Supreme Court 
eventually settled the question in Slaight. The Court held that limitations on Charter 
rights imposed by discretionary powers were "prescribed by law." This was because the 
holder of the power derives that power from statute. "It is the legislative provision 
conferring discretion which limits the right to freedom, since it is what authorises the 
holder of such discretion to make an order the effect of which is to place limits on the 
rights and freedoms mentioned in the Charter. "52 McLean et al argue that unless New 
Zealand courts adopt the Slaight approach, s5 will never have any effect.53 Under this 
approach there is no doubt that the Government residence policy is prescribed by law. 
In Noori, Richardson J provided the only discussion of the parameters of a "reasonable 
limits" test. He suggested that the more advanced Canadian jurisprudence would provide 
helpful guidelines and gave conditional support for the Oakes test. 54 Under this test the 
50See above n 41 , 260. 
51 R v Thomsen ( 1988) 63 CR (3d) l . 
52See above n 49, 446. 
53 See McLean, above n 40, 77. 
54Named after R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, 134. 
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onus of proving the reasonableness of the limit falls on the party defending the policy. The 
version of the test set out here comes from R v Chau/k: 55 
The objective of the impugned provision must be of sufficient importance to 
warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom; it must 
relate to concerns which arc pressing and substantial in a free and 
democratic society before it can be characterised as sufficiently important. 
2 Assuming that a sufficiently important objective has been established, the 
means chosen to achieve the objective must pass a proportionality test; that 
is to say they must: 
(a) be rationally connected to the objective and not be arbitrary, unfair or 
based on irrational considerations; and 
(b) impair the right or freedom in question as little as possible; and 
(c) be such that their effects on the limitation of rights and freedoms are 
proportional to the objective. 
Whilst the New Zealand courts may ultimately create their own test for reasonable limits, 
t4e Oakes test provides a useful basis of inquiry for this paper. In the next section the test 
will be applied to the prima facie infringing residence policies to determine whether they 
are reasonable limits. 
1 The importance of the objective 
(a) Good health requirement objective 
No specific objective is given for this policy in the Immigration Manual but the 
"Self Assessment Guide for Residence in New Zealand," which is published by the 
New Zealand Immigration Service does give an objective. It says that the 
requirement is to ensure that the applicants do not require extensive medical 
treatment or care, or cause others to become ill while in New Zealand. This 
objective is likely to be sufficiently important to warrant limits on the right to 
freedom from discrimination. 
55(1991) 2 CR (4th) 1, 27-28. This Yersion of the test is adopted here because it contains the same 
elements as the original version from Oakes but has the merit of being more simply set out. In their 
discussion of the application of the Bill of Rights to Administrative Law, McLean et al also applied 
this version of the Oakes test. See above n 40. 
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(b) Residence policy objectives 
The Immigration Manual contains the following objectives for Government 
residence policy: 
(i) Generic residence policy objectives: 
- to contribute to the Governments Growth strategies with social cohesion; and 
- to maintain provision for migrants to enter New Zealand for social and 
humanitarian reasons 
(ii) Specific General Skills and Business Investor category objectives: 
- to select migrants who can contribute to growth strategies over the medium 
term through: 
- increasing overall levels of human capital, enterprise, and innovation; 
and 
- fostering international links 
(iii) Specific Family category objectives: 
- to permit New Zealand citizens or residents to be joined in New Zealand by 
their eligible spouses, partners, parents, siblings, adult children, or dependant 
children; and 
- to provide avenues through which immigrants who have already settled in 
New Zealand may sponsor the entry of other eligible members of their 
immediate family; and help them settle by providing practical and emotional 
support. 
Since immigration is a highly political issue, these objectives are arguably all 
important enough to warrant limiting rights. As noted above, the onus of proving this 
is on the Government. However, it has been pointed out that the courts will be very 
unlikely to find that the objective wasn't sufficiently in1portant, because they are 
reluctant to hold that the Government acted without good reason. 56 
(c) Pitcairn Island policy objective 
The objective of this policy is to assist the Pitcairn Islanders because there are few 
employment opportunities on the Island. This will probably satisfy the requirement of 
being a sufficiently important objective. 
56See McLean, above n 40, 78. 
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2 Proportionality of means 
This part of the test involves three aspects. The first is rationality, the second is least 
possible impairment of the rights; the third is whether the limit is proportionate to the 
importance of the objective. To make it easier to compare the objectives and the policies, 
the policies have been grouped under the relevant application categories. 
(a) General good health requirement 
The policy is rationally connected to its objectives and the least limiting option has 
probably been chosen. The courts almost certainly would find that the objective of 
ensuring public safety outweighs the harm caused by the policy of refusing entry to 
people with serious contagious diseases. They will probably find that the objective of 
avoiding a burden on the public health system would outweigh the harm caused by 
not allowing entry to people who have poor health but do not carry contagious 
diseases . This is because the public health service results from a "contract" between 
citizens and the state and because the state could not support the financial cost of 
allowing immigrants to come here for the purpose of receiving free health. Since this 
limit satisfies all three requirements of proportionality, it is a reasonable one. 
(b) General skills and investor categories 
(i) Polygamous marriages 
If a polygamous marriages is recognised in the country where it was performed, 
it will also be recognised in New Zealand. No law is breached and there is no 
rational connection between this policy and the objectives. There is no need to 
assess the policy in terms of the remaining requirements of proportionality if it 
fails the first one. This policy i~ l'I,\ / ..:..) 
' (ii) Age 
Under the Business Investor and General Skills categories, the Government is 
concerned with medium term growth and increasing human capital. Age is 
relevant to these objectives because people who are closer to retirement age will 
add less in terms of the objectives. This probably means that the maximum age 
limits in each category are the least impairing option and are proportionate to the 
importance of the objectives . However, there is no reason why a 24 year old 
must receive fewer points than a 25 year old or a 28 year old. The age bands are 
too narrow to be the least infringing option. In addition, the bands ought to begin 
at 16 years because it is the commencing age for the ground of age 
discrimination. Since the policy fails the second proportionality requirement it is 
not a reasonable limit. 
(iii) Homosexual partners 
There is no rational connection between the objectives and the policy of denying 
primary applicants, who are in homosexual relationships, the right to include 
their partners on their application. This policy is not a reasonable limit. 
(iv) Language requirement 
The policy requiring secondary applicants to speak English is not rationally 
connected to the specific objectives of the Business Investor and General Skills 
categories. It may be rationally connected to the general objective of providing 
for growth with social cohesion, if social cohesion depends on all members of 
our society speaking the same language. However, the Government could not 
accept this view of social cohesion since New Zealand has two official 
languages. 57 If social cohesion does not depend on everyone speaking the same 
language, there is no rational connection between the policy and the stated 
objectives, so it must be an unreasonable limit. 
Speaking English may be essential to a primary applicant's ability to contribute 
to the Government's growth strategies through increasing the level of human 
capital and enterprise. If so, there is a rational connection between the policy and 
this objective. However, the policy does not impair the right as little as possible. 
This is because a primary applicant who satisfies the minimum English 
requirement, but includes her or his family on the application, will not get a visa 
or permit unless the other family members satisfy the language requirement or 
they pay a large bond. 
Since it has already been argued that the policy concerning secondary applicants 
is unreasonable, the requirements imposed on the primary applicant seem 
unnecessarily restrictive. In any case, the objective is not to be proportionate to 
the harm of discriminating on the basis of immutable characteristics such as 
race. This policy is not a reasonable limit. 
(v) Minimum work experience 
This policy seems to be based on an assumption that a recently qualified 
graduate or tradesperson with less than two years relevant work experience is 
57Maori and English. Maori was made an official language by the Maori Language Act 1987. 
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less able to contribute to the Governments objectives than someone with the 
work experience. There is probably no evidence to support this assumption so 
the policy is not rationally connected to its objectives. Even if there were a 
rational basis to this policy, it would not be the least limiting option. The least 
limiting option would be to allow unemployed people with no relevant work 
experience to apply on the basis that they compete against those who have work 
experience and who will receive additional points for their experience. Since it 
results in indirect discrimination against unemployed people who have not yet 
obtained work in the field that they have qualified in, this policy is not a 
reasonable limit. 
(b) Family 
(i) Polygamous marriages 
The arguments made under the Business Skills and Investor categories also 
apply under the Family category. 
(ii) Married siblings or children 
There is no apparent connection between this policy and the general objectives. 
It is connected to the first Family category objective but only because the 
objective refers to "eligible" family . If this word were removed then the policy 
definitely wouldn't be rationally connected. However the inclusion of "eligible" 
suggests that the objective is implicitly aimed at giving priority to certain family 
members . When the policy is looked at in the context of the other Family 
category criteria, it is obvious that policy's focus is on whether the nucleus of the 
family is in New Zealand. Adult children or siblings cannot apply if they are 
married, living in a permanent relationship, or have children. Parents of New 
Zealand residents or citizens may not apply if they have more dependent children 
in their home country than adult children in New Zealand. 
With a limit on the number of immigrants who can enter each year, the 
Government may think it is preferable to give priority to those whose family is 
almost entirely in New Zealand. If this view is correct then the discrimination 
against married siblings may be the least limiting option. When the policy is 
balanced against the objective, the harm is proportionate to the importance of the 
objective. This policy probably constitutes a reasonable limit. 
(iii) Homosexual partners 
The policy requiring homosexual partners to live together for two years longer 
than heterosexual partners before they can apply under the Family category has 
no rational connection to the general objectives. However, because the Family 
objective refers to "eligible" spouses and partners it is rationally connected to the 
policy. However, it is not the least limiting option. The least limiting option 
would be to treat homosexual and heterosexual couples the same way. This 
would remove the discrimination altogether. As it stands, the policy is not a 
reasonable limit. 
(c) Pitcairn Island policy 
The policy of imposing lower entry requirements and the objective of this category 
are rationally. The policy is also the least limiting option. Is the importance of the 
objective proportionate to the policy's effect on the right to be free from 
discrimination on the basis of nationality? The answer must be yes. This policy is 
akin to affirmative action because it offers special assistance to individuals who are 
disadvantaged, although by circumstances other than discrimination. 
Under the second approach, those policies that impose reasonable limits on the freedom 
from discrimination are not in breach of the Bill of Rights nor ultra vires the Immigration 
Act. The only policies that appear to fall into this category are the good health 
requirement, the exclusion of married sibling or children from the Family category, and 
the concessions made for Pitcairn Islander. The policies that are not reasonable limits are 
ultra vires . The policies that fall into this category are: the exclusion of more than one 
partner in a polygamous marriage; the allocation of points based on age; the exclusion of 
homosexual partners under the General Skills and Business Investor categories; the 
language requirements; the minimum work experience requirement; and the additional 
length of cohabitation required before homosexual partners are allowed to apply under the 
Family category. 
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VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the process of deciding whether Government residence policy breached the Bill of 
Rights, I discussed the legal status of the policy and concluded that it had not been altered 
by the new provisions of the Immigration Act. They remain a set of voluntary rules. I also 
discussed the effect of the Human Rights Act on the Bill of Rights and concluded that it 
had no significant impact. The Bill of Rights is separate remedy. 
The paper covered two ways of applying the operational provisions. The first approach 
gave priority to s6 of the Bill of Rights . Since the policy was produced under the authority 
of the Immigration Act, it was necessary to see whether the empowering provisions of the 
Immigration Act authorised the Minister and immigration officials to breach the Bill of 
Rights when granting residence visas and permits. The Immigration Act can be read 
consistently if the principle in Slaight is applied. This results in all the immigration 
policies that prima facie infringed the Bill of Rights, being ultra vires the Immigration Act. 
I argued that this approach is preferable when the Bill of Rights is applied to delegated 
powers. The second approach requires ss5 and 6 to be read together. It results in a 
"watering down" of the rights when they are applied to delegated powers because some of 
the infringements became excusable as "reasonable limits ." Both approaches show that the 
c~rrent Government residence policy breaches the Bill of Rights . 
One more question remains . Do rejected applicants have the right to bring an action for 
breach of the Bill of Rights against the New Zealand Government? The Bill of Rights 
does not say that the rights and freedoms it affirms belong only to New Zealand citizens or 
residents. Instead it says that government action will be subject to those rights and 
freedoms . Any applicant who is in New Zealand ought to be able to bring an action breach 
of the Act. It may also be possible for immediate relatives or associates to claim on behalf 
of'an applicant by adopting a rule of standing consistent with s21(2)(a) of the Human 
Rights Act. 
It is not clear whether the Act extends to applicants residing in other countries . The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not apply to people who are not physically 
in Canada_58 Should the New Zealand courts adopt the same view of our Bill of Rights? 
Several arguments support the extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights . Firstly, 
foreign service officers are an extension of the Government so they are bound to act 
consistently with the Bill of Rights . Secondly, the Immigration Act has some 
58Canadian Council a/Churches v Canada [1990] 2 FC, 534; 10 Imm LR (2d) 81. 
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extraterritorial application because applications must satisfy its requirements and have a 
right of appeal under it, whether or not they are physically in New Zealand. There is no 
reason for applicants not to have a remedy under the Bill of Rights as well . Thirdly there 
is no breach of the sovereign power of another state, since no other state's laws or powers 
are affected in any way. The courts would be unduly timid if they failed to recognise the 
right of non-citizens to seek a remedy when the Government unlawfully discriminates 
against them. 
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